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We present RunStream, a rapid prototyping framework for realizing stream cipher implementations based
on algorithmic specifications and architectural customizations desired by the users. In the dynamic world of
cryptography where newer recommendations are frequently proposed, the need of such tools is imperative. It
carries out design validation and generates an optimized software implementation and a synthesizable Register
Transfer Level Verilog description. Our framework enables speedy benchmarking against critical resources
like area, throughput, power, latency and allows exploration of alternatives. Using RunStream, we successfully
implemented various stream ciphers and benchmarked the quality of results to be on-par with already-known
hand-optimized implementations.
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1. INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION
The world of cryptography is highly dynamic, the change being constantly fueled by var-
ious factors, some of which we highlight. Successful cryptanalysis not only renders the
further use of broken ciphers vulnerable but also open doors for newer/modified sub-
sequent proposals. Development of Custom hardware aids cryptanalytic attacks by en-
abling even the brute force attacks for small key sized proposals today. Architectural
updates in GPPs influence cryptographic schemes as the block sizes of software oriented
cryptographic proposals are aligned with word sizes of latest computing devices. Also
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the imminent ubiquitous computing era has patronized newer security applications, e.g.,
lightweight cryptography. Consequently, lightweight cryptographic proposals aiming a
thrifty area-power budget with reasonable security are frequently proposed.
An increased interest in subsequent cryptographic competitions, including AES [AES
1997], NESSIE [NESSIE 2000], CRYPTREC [CRYPTREC 2003], eSTREAM [eSTREAM
2008], SHA-3 [SHA-3 2012], CAESER [CAESAR 2012] is evident by their growing num-
ber of candidate proposals submitted compared to their successor. The initial phase of eS-
TREAM competition for stream ciphers attracted 34 proposals [eSTREAM 2008]. Most of
these proposals support multiple modes and versions for variable key, IV and block sizes.
Quantifying their performance as custom VLSI implementations requires benchmarking
against diverse parameters like area, power, throughput, latency etc. The human-driven
process of writing and validating HDL for stream ciphers is slow, error prone and requires
expertise both in algorithm and hardware design domains to reach the options best suited
for an application requirement. The workload is further compounded by the violation of
generalization that stream ciphers always outdo block ciphers in resource economization
since lightweight block ciphers are now in picture. Hence, in principle, stream ciphers’
resource evaluation should also be benchmarked against comparable block ciphers and
vice versa.
We aim to solve these problems through automation. RunStream is a rapid prototyp-
ing framework to quickly and efficiently realize stream cipher implementations from
user specified configurations. This approach significantly shortens the VLSI design cy-
cle, boosting productivity without tiring the designer into the low level implementation
trivialities. It allows a quick hardware resource estimation, early functional validation
of desirable cipher properties and speedy exploration/selection among a wide space of
high quality cipher proposals. With a similar motivation, we earlier presented RunFein
(RAPID-FeinSPN) [Khalid et al. 2013], that caters to the rapid prototyping of block ci-
phers. RunStream completes the picture for symmetric key cryptography by catering to
stream ciphers. The quality-of-results for area/timing rival the hand-crafted cipher im-
plementations.
1.1. Previous Work
Various high-level synthesis (HLS) tools to quicken the VLSI design cycle have been pro-
posed both academically and commercially. Noticeable examples include Vivado HLS by
Xilinx [Vivado 2012], GAUT [GAUT 2007], Synphony C by Synopsys [Synphony 2009],
C-to-Silicon compiler by Cadence [Cadence 2009], Hercules [Ajax 2009], Handel C by
Mentor Graphics [Mentorgraphics 1996]. These modeling environment tools accept con-
cise representations of design specifications to generate an HDL implementation. The
design specifications are in a higher abstraction level and often require learning a new
language. Additionally, as none of these tools focus on any specific application class, the
optimizations undertaken remain generic and often suboptimal compared to the hand
optimized implementations. Two case studies taking up HDL code for modern crypto-
graphic algorithms and generating HDL descriptions by a new generation HLS tool (Vi-
vado HLS by Xilinx [Vivado 2012]) are worth mentioning. In [Gaj et al. 2010], all the five
round-3, SHA-3 candidates were undertaken by the Vivado HLS tool and performance
benchmarked for TPAR against manual RTL. In-spite of various iterations of the source
code modifications by pragmas (constraints) to economize hardware resources, the TPAR
for HLS remains between 62% - 85% lower, compared to manual RTL for various Altera
devices. Similarly, noticeable performance penalty is caused by the HLS tool when vari-
ous configurations of AES are generated and performance profiled on different families
of FPGAs [Homsirikamol and Gaj 2014]. On a Virtex-7 FPGA, the degradation of HLS
AES in terms of TPAR lags behind 28% to 42%, compared to manual RTL.
Taking up an orthogonal approach to high-level synthesis, we present a language in-
dependent configurable design space catering to domain specific cryptographic functions.
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This also eliminates the dependence of design quality on the coding style of the pro-
grammer which is the case with conventional HLS tools. After analyzing cryptographic
workloads we identified the set of constructive components and structural customizations
that are generic enough to define the algorithm and architecture of any stream cipher.
The user specified design configuration comprises of a set of these functionally complete
constructive elements. RunStream accepts a sophisticated design capture of high-level
design configuration through a GUI. The design is then validated for completeness and
correctness. These rule checks detect functional and system-level problems much ear-
lier in the design cycle improving design reliability and shortening time to market. The
tool infers the necessary interfaces and structures to implement optimized HDL along
with verification environments and necessary scripts. It provides a seamless end to end
verification from the configuration to RTL validation/verification environments.
1.2. Original Contribution
The noteworthy contributions of this work are listed.
— We surveyed a diverse and wide range of stream ciphers to systematically build up a
functionally complete set of constructive elements/structures to define the configuration
space of any stream cipher.
— The configuration model completeness and RunStream tool effectiveness is validated by
implementing some bit/byte/word oriented prominent stream ciphers and benchmark-
ing their performance to match their manual implementations.
— We integrated NIST test suite with RunStream for evaluation of statistical randomness
of the encrypted data.
Rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 classifies stream ciphers and elab-
orates their constructive design elements. The overall RunStream toolflow is presented
in Section 3, while the details of software and hardware generation engines is discussed
in Section 4. Experimental evaluation of RunStream is discussed in Section 5. Section 6
concludes the paper and presents an outlook to this work.
2. INGREDIENTS OF A STREAM CIPHER
In this section, we present background material on stream ciphers, including their clas-
sification, typical elements of construction along with their modes of operation. Since
our goal is to define configuration space of stream ciphers for high level synthesis, we
strictly focus on their architectural/operational constructs. Their complexity, statistical
and cryptanalytic properties are therefore skipped but could be referred from [Menezes
et al. 1996, Chapter 6].
2.1. Stream Ciphers: Definition and Classification
Stream ciphers encrypt a stream of individual characters (bits or words), while block ci-
phers operate on chunks of blocks. Unlike the memoryless nature of block ciphers, the en-
cryption/decryption transformation of stream ciphers is dependent on their current state,
consequently, they are also termed as state ciphers. Their judiciously-chosen lightweight
Boolean operations make them suitable for environments where resources are restricted
and sustaining a high throughput is critical.
Two classes of stream ciphers are Synchronous or Self-synchronizing stream ciphers.
A formal definition from [Menezes et al. 1996, Chapter 6] and a block diagram of the two
types is depicted in Fig. 1.
The initial state (σ0) of stream ciphers is generated by Initialization function (init)
based on key (k) and Initialization Vector (IV). For a synchronous stream cipher, the
State update function (f) calculates next state (σt+1) depending upon the current state
only, while for self-synchronizing stream ciphers, the internal state comprises of a fixed
number (l) of previous ciphertexts generated. Due to this dependence on ciphertext, the
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keystream for self-synchronizing stream ciphers cannot be precomputed. The keystream
function (g) transforms the current state (and the key in case of self-synchronizing stream
ciphers) to generate keystream. Additive stream ciphers have Output filter function (h)
as an XOR function, the inverse function (h−1) at receiver is also a XOR function. Addi-
tive stream ciphers generating bits of keystream are termed as Binary additive stream
ciphers.
Fig. 1. Synchronous stream cipher (left) and self-synchronizing stream cipher (right)
2.2. Sequential Prototypes
A Stream cipher can be modeled as a regular clocked finite state machine (FSM). Like
any FSM, it has sequential and combinational parts. The sequential registers hold the
internal state of stream ciphers. Typical structures used for their construction are given
here.
2.2.1. FSR:. A Finite Shift Register (FSR) comprises of L delay elements, each of which
is shifted to the next at each clock cycle, as shown in Fig. 2 (left). The content of stage 0
forms the output of the FSR, while the new content of stage L− 1 is calculated based on
a feedback function. Each ci is a single bit number controlling the inclusion of ith stage
value in the calculation of the feedback function. The categorization of types of FSR is
done based on the nature of the feedback function. We enlist here the prominent ones.
Stage
L-1
c
1
Feedback function
Stage
L-2
Stage
1
Stage
0
...
c
2
c
L-1
c
L
output
s
j
s
j-1
s
j-2
s
j-L+1
s
j-L
div 2 (summation)
s
j-1
s
j-2
s
j-L+1
s
j-L...
s
j
carry% 2
Fig. 2. A Feedback Shift Register, FSR (left) a carry Linear feedback shift register FCSR (right)
— LFSR/NFSR: Depending on the feedback function being linear or non-linear, an FSR
is categorized as a linear FSR (LFSR) or nonlinear FSR (NFSR). Fig. 2 (left) shows an
LFSR with feedback function comprising of bit-wise XOR of the contents of all stages
for which cL−i = 1.
sj = (c1.sj−1 ⊕ c2.sj−2 ⊕ . . .⊕ cL.sj−L) for j ≥ L
— FCSR: Feedback with Carry Shift Register (FCSR) is an NFSR that has summation
as feedback function, as shown in Fig. 2 (right). It keeps an extra memory bit carry to
retain the carry from one addition to be added up in the next cycle’s addition.
sum = (c1.sj−1 + c2.sj−2 + . . .+ cL.sj−L + carry) for j ≥ L
where sj and carry are the remainder and dividend of 2, respectively.
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2.2.2. Jump Registers. Jump registers form a cascade of multiple delay elements, each
of which implements an autonomous Linear FSM. Each of these delay elements have a
corresponding controlling jump bit to make them jump to a new value [Jansen 2004]. Two
noticeable eSTREAM candidate ciphers that use jump registers are MICKEY [Babbage
and Dodd 2006; 2008] and POMARANCH [Helleseth et al. 2006].
2.2.3. FSM Registers. Other than the cascade shift register constructions, sequential reg-
isters may also be used to hold the ciphers state. Stream ciphers using these FSM regis-
ters (other than FSRs) include SNOW 3G [3G 2006] and ZUC [ZUC 2011]. RC4 [Schneier
1996] and HC-128 [Wu 2008] require 2K and 32K bits of state information, respectively.
2.3. Nonlinear Combination Generators
2.3.1. For LFSR based Stream Ciphers. LFSRs are a favorite primitive for stream ciphers
design due to their desirable statistical properties and hardware friendly nature. Their
susceptibility to chosen plaintext attack must be overcome by breaking their linearity ac-
cording to these recommended and analyzed constructions [Menezes et al. 1996, Chapter
6].
Fig. 3. Nonlinear filter generator (left) Nonlinear output from multiple LFSRs (right)
— Nonlinear Filter Generator: The output of an LFSR is generated through a nonlinear
filter generator. At each clock it takes bits/words from fixed locations of LFSR to non-
linearly generate output as shown in Fig. 3(left).
— Nonlinear Output from Multiple LFSRs: Multiple LFSRs are used in parallel and the
keystream is generated as a nonlinear transformation of the outputs of LFSRs as shown
in Fig. 3(right). Stream ciphers using this construction are called nonlinear combination
generators and the nonlinear function is called the combining function. Geffe generator
and summation generator are examples of such combining functions.
— Clock Controlled Generators: Clock controlled generators introduce the nonlinearity in
LFSRs by making the clocking irregular. The LFSRs are not clocked at every cycle and
clocking of one LFSR is controlled by the Boolean transformation of another LFSR taps
and vice versa. Some known techniques of clock controlled generators are alternating
step generator, shrinking generator etc.
2.3.2. Other Designs. A nonlinear update function for a popular stream cipher
RC4 [Schneier 1996] is the Triangular function (T-Function). RC4 has an internal state of
256 Byte array, denoted by S[0 . . . N−1] and accessed by indices i and j. In every iteration
of Keystream generation phase, the T-function increments i, updates j by j = j + S[i],
swaps values of S[i] and S[j] and produces one byte of output as S[S[i] + S[j]]. Many
RC4 variants, including RC4+ [Maitra and Paul 2008], VMPC [Zoltak 2004] and the re-
cently proposed Spritz [Rivest and Schuldt 2014] use RC4-like general design principle
of T-function.
2.4. Combinational Primitives
The combinational primitives are required to configure and specify the initialization
(init), state update function (f), keystream generation function (g) and output filter function
(h) of a stream cipher as given in Fig. 1. The feedback function of FSRs, jump registers
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and FSM registers as well as the functionality of nonlinear combination generators (as
discussed in Section 2.3) is described and configured using these combinational primi-
tives.
These primitives include Boolean, arithmetic and bitwise operations (including arith-
metic/logical shifts, rotations). For non-binary stream ciphers, field operations, S-Box and
P-Box are employed. Other glue logic elements like multiplexers are required to change
the behavior of a cipher as its phase changes.
2.5. Operational Phases
Stream ciphers have the following three phases of operation.
— Key/IV Setup: This phase initializes the state of stream ciphers, based on the secret key
and IV (or nonce, i.e., number used once) provided by the user. The key and IV values
may require some preprocessing (init in Fig. 1) before being fed into the stream cipher
structure. For FSR based stream ciphers, the Key/IV Setup requires at least as many
cycles as the length of the FSR to alter its initial value.
— Randomization/Runup/Warmup: The randomization phase sufficiently scrambles the
state of the cipher based on Key and the IV, before the keystream is generated. Since
this phase does not generate valid keystream, its duration is a trade-off between secu-
rity and speed.
— Keystream Generation Phase: The keystream bits/words are produced as the randomiza-
tion phase is over. A continuous keystream is generated that determines the throughput
of the system.
Since no stream cipher output is generated during the first two phases, they are to-
gether named as keystream Initialization. For every new key, IV combination, Initial-
ization must be carried out before valid keystream generation. Consequently, ciphers
requiring frequent re-initialization have this initialization latency as a possible bottle-
neck.
2.6. Stream Cipher Sample Set
We pick up a diverse set of stream ciphers for results, discussion and implementation
by RunStream. Table I gives their classification on the basis of their composing con-
structions and their salient features, while Table II summarizes the best known attacks
against them till date. A/5-1 was part of the original encryption algorithm for GSM,
but since it was export restricted, A/5-2 was developed. They were reverse engineered
and verified and the design was revealed [Briceno et al. 1999]. Both of these are multi-
ple LFSR based stream ciphers, using irregular clocking for nonlinearity. E0 [Bluetooth
2001] is also an LFSR based stream cipher with a summation combiner used for output
generation. It was used in Bluetooth communication. Although the security of these pro-
posals have been compromised [Barkan et al. 2003; Goldberg et al. 1999; Lu et al. 2005],
we included them nevertheless for comparison against their known implementations.
eSTREAM was launched to restore the confidence of cryptographic community on
stream ciphers as questions were raised on their usability [Shamir 2004]. Some popular
stream ciphers, when found flawed, were replaced by block ciphers, e.g., KASUMI (or A/5-
3) block cipher [3GPP 1999] replaced A/5-1 and A/5-2 stream ciphers after weaknesses
were pointed out [Barkan et al. 2003; Goldberg et al. 1999], WPA/WPA2 use AES based
security, unlike its predecessor WEP, that used RC4 stream cipher. Moreover, all the 6
proposals of an earlier competition NESSIE succumbed to cryptanalysis, eSTREAM was
launched. It was initiated by EU ECRYPT network and took four years effort to finalize
new stream cipher proposals [eSTREAM 2008].
The initial phase of eSTREAM attracted 34 proposals. Out of these only two proposals
(SSS and Moustique) were self-synchronizing stream ciphers while the rest were all syn-
chronous. After various phases of thorough scrutiny, judging the security, performance,
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Table I. Classification, construction and Salient Features of stream ciphers
Classification/Construction Salient Features
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A-5/1 4 4 4 4 7 7 7 7 4 4 7 1 64 22
A-5/2 4 4 4 4 7 7 7 7 4 4 4 1 64 22
E0 4 4 4 4 7 7 7 4 7 4 4 1 8-128 -
Grain-v1 4 4 4 4 7 4 7 7 7 4 4 1 80 64
Grain-128 4 4 4 4 7 4 7 7 7 4 4 1 128 96
Grain-128a 4 4 4 4 7 4 7 7 7 4 4 1 128 96
Trivium 4 4 4 4 7 7 7 7 7 4 7 1 80 80
MICKEY 2.0 4 4 4 7 7 4 4 7 7 7 7 1 80 80
MICKEY-128 4 4 4 7 7 4 4 7 7 7 7 1 128 128
RC4 4 4 7 7 7 7 7 4 7 7 4 8 40-2K -
ZUC 4 4 7 7 7 4 7 4 7 7 4 32 128 128
SNOW 3G 4 4 7 7 7 4 7 4 7 7 4 32 128 128
Table II. Best known state recovery and key recovery attacks against stream ciphers
State Recovery Attack Comp. Complexity Key Recovery Attack Comp. Complexity
A-5/1 [Barkan et al. 2003] < 1 sec on a PC - -
A-5/2 [Goldberg et al. 1999] 216 dot products - -
E0 - − [Lu et al. 2005] 240
Grain-v1 [Bjørstad 2008] 271 [Berbain et al. 2006] 243
Grain-128 [Mihaljevic et al. 2012] 298 [Dinur et al. 2011] 290
Grain-128a - - - -
Trivium [Maximov and Biryukov 2007] 192× 283.5 [Dinur and Shamir 2009] 245
MICKEY 2.0 - - - -
MICKEY-128 - - - -
RC4 [Maximov and Khovratovich 2008] 2241 [Basu et al. 2009] 253
ZUC - - - -
SNOW 3G - - - -
simplicity and flexibility of these proposals, 7 were included in the portfolio, 4 in soft-
ware profile and 3 in hardware profile. We take up these three stream ciphers (along
with their modified versions) in the hardware profile of eSTREAM portfolio including
Grain-v1 [Hell et al. 2007], Grain-128 [Hell et al. 2006], Grain-128a [A¨gren et al. 2011],
MICKEY 2.0 [Babbage and Dodd 2006], MICKEY-128 [Babbage and Dodd 2008] and
Trivium [De Canniere and Preneel 2005]. Their design diversity makes them good can-
didates for HLS, i.e., MICKEY is based on jump registers, Trivium employs 3 LFSRs,
Grain has one LFSR and one NFSR. No successful cryptanalytic effort against them has
yet been reported.
For non-binary stream ciphers, we take up RC4 [Schneier 1996], most commonly used
to protect Internet traffic using the SSL (Secure Sockets Layer) protocol, Transport Layer
Security (TLS), WEP (Wired Equivalent Privacy), Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA), along
with several application layer softwares. We also take up ZUC [ZUC 2011] and SNOW
3G [3G 2006], both of whom have been included in the security portfolio of 3GPP LTE-
Advanced, the potential candidate for 4G mobile broadband communication standard.
They generate 32-bit words of keystream and have internally 16 tap NFSRs.
The RunStream methodology provides a rich configuration design space, comprehen-
sive enough to model a diverse range of stream cipher classifications. It covers the
L/N FSR based structures that are favorite primitives for many hardware-oriented
stream ciphers. Similarly, the software based designs, commonly employing S/P-Boxes,
T-functions, large states and other arithmetic/logical operations can be prototyped. Hy-
brid designs, employing a combination of these primitives are also realizable using Run-
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Stream. Additionally, block ciphers based on stream ciphers (e.g., KATAN, KATAN-
TAN [De Canniere et al. 2009]) can also be realized. RunStream supports modular com-
position of cryptographic building blocks, which can be conveniently extended to support
newer proposals if/when the need arises.
3. RUNSTREAM TOOLFLOW
RunStream is developed around the concepts of modularity and extensibility. For stream
ciphers, cryptographers are free to choose from a large set of cryptographic primi-
tives/structures since unlike block ciphers, stream ciphers do not have a standard
model/structure for their construction. A key challenge addressed in this work is to iden-
tify a complete set of sub-structures that fulfill this diverse range of ciphers. The con-
structive composition of the design, consequently translates to rich primitive libraries for
software and hardware realizations. Performance benchmarking/design validation and
support for statistical analysis requires additional checks and function definitions. The
biggest technical challenge is to develop a tool capable of seamlessly integrating these
sub-structures and functions into a working model, without sacrificing the performance
of the implementation, both of software and hardware platforms. RunStream validates
the design capture and successfully abstracts away the diversity of the design space by
translating the configuration into a generic stream cipher template. The design optimal-
ity is carefully preserved in HDL realization and is experimentally benchmarked to be in
par with hand crafted realizations.
The toolflow of RunStream is shown in Fig. 4. The user populates the configuration
space of a stream cipher, along with test vectors and gets customized implementations.
The configuration for a cipher could be added, parameter by parameter, or could be saved
and loaded later for easier manipulation. A list of known cipher configurations (given in
Table I) is provided along. The configurations undergo a set of design rule checks before
generating the software and hardware implementations.
Fig. 4. RunStream Toolflow
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3.1. Cipher Configuration Space
This section discusses the configuration space parameters, generic enough for any stream
cipher. The configuration parameter set is categorized into elementary parameters, se-
quential state information and a mesh of operations. (All parameterizable attributes that
a user must populate are highlighted in the proceeding discussion).
— Elementary parameters: The granularity/wordsize of a stream cipher is represented as
Sw. Elementary parameters including the sizes of key and IV, represented as SK and
SIV, respectively, are described in terms of number of words. The set of test vectors
includes Key and IV values along with the expected Keystream for verification, speci-
fied in terms of a known endianess. For simplicity, the three phases of a stream cipher
(as given in Section 2.5) are referred as phase0, phase1 and phase2. The number of op-
erational cycles for the three phases of stream ciphers is defined as Pi cnt by the user,
where i is the phase number.
— Sequential state information: Each of the various types of sequential elements (as dis-
cussed in Section 2.2) is defined as a register array. The user specifies the total number
of register arrays, along with the type of each (FSR, jump register, FSM register).
The granularity of each element of these arrays is also specified, since it may or may
not match the wordsize of the cipher. The depth of the register array is the number of
delay elements in the FSR/jump register array; for individual FSM registers, the array
depth is configured as 1. The clocking of these register arrays can be specified to be
regular or conditional.
— Mesh of operations: The combinational primitives of the stream cipher (discussed in
Section 2.4) are specified as a mesh of operations. This mesh comprises of nodes of op-
erations that interact with each other through interconnects. This mesh is a Graph (G),
defined by vertices (nodes) and edges (interconnects). Each interconnect representing
the directed edge between nodes is specified by an ordered pair of initial node and ter-
minal node. The width of interconnects entering and leaving a node may not always be
equal (for nodes with ciphers operations like concatenation or bit splitting), requiring
explicit specification. Hence the user specifies the total number of nodes along with
the width of each and an ordered pair specifying initial and terminal node numbers.
For each node, the user must also specify an atomic operation, comprising of either of
the following operational classes.
— Basic Boolean operations: AND, OR, NOT, XOR
— Arithmetic operations: Add, subtract, multiply, divide (by power of two)
— Bit-wise operations: Arithmetic shifts, logical shifts, rotation, rotation with carry
— Cryptographic primitives: S-Box, P-Box
— Galois Field Operations: GF-multiplication, GF-division
— Bit Manipulation: bit masking, concatenation / bit-reorganization
— Glue logic: Multiplexers, constants, no-operation
This parameterization covers the configuration space of today’s stream ciphers (includ-
ing the ones in Table I) and can be enhanced to accommodate any newer, non-typical
future proposals. The framework is aided by a user-friendly GUI for a sophisticated con-
figuration capture, convenient default values are provided by the tool in the GUI wher-
ever necessary. The S-Box/P-Box values can be efficiently added using text files. It is
worth highlighting that a cipher may have multiple configurations that are algorithmi-
cally equivalent. For example, a lookup table node (S-Box) could be replaced by a series
of several combinational logic nodes to trade for better area efficiency (but higher critical
time), without changing the cipher. Noteworthy is the fact that RunStream can be config-
ured to implement an S-Box as a LUT or any other combinational logic with its nodes.
Hence various design options could be quickly explored for reaching an optimal solution.
Trivium cipher configuration - A walk-through: We take up a typical synchronous
stream cipher, Trivium [De Canniere and Preneel 2005] from eSTREAM and try to work-
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out its configuration according to the discussed configuration space. Trivium’s 288-bit
internal state consists of 3 regularly clocked LFSRs of different lengths. It has an 80 bit
Key and an 80 bit IV, with phase0 and phase1 defined to be 288 and (288× 4) cycles, re-
spectively. The architectural details of Trivium are depicted in Fig. 5, the 3-to-1 MUXes
control the input to the LFSRs under three different phases of operation. The user must
first identify all atomic operations (AND, XOR, MUX) as a separate operational node and
then enumerate them (not in any specific order). A total of 13 nodes describe the com-
plete functionality of the cipher (The node number, register number is highlighted and
placed at the bottom right of each node). Fig. 12 shows a GUI snapshot of RunStream
with Trivium configuration.
Fig. 5. Architectural structure of Trivium implementation
The three LFSRs are right shifted once per clock cycle and named R0, R1 and R2;
granularity being 1 bit, unconditionally clocked and the depth is specified to be 93, 84
and 111, respectively. All configuration parameters for Trivium are fed to the tool’s GUI
and are stored as an xml configuration file, a snapshot of which is shown in Fig. 6. The
information for each of the FSR is kept as a separate token in the file, for R0 the size,
type, granularity and clocking can be seen. For each of the 13 nodes, the user specifies an
operation (R0), output width (wordsizeout) and the node input sources (discussed in detail
in the next section). The node generating the final keystream is specified as separate
token (keystream). The feedback for each of the three registers is also specified by a node
number. Other elementary parameters like the number of phases, cycles for each phase
and the test vectors (not shown in Fig. 6) are also specified and saved as part of the cipher
configuration.
3.2. Cipher Model Creation and Validation
The configuration file is parsed by RunStream and stream cipher model is created com-
prising of a controller and datapath. The controller keeps track of the phase changes by
aid of a counter, according to the cycle count of phases specified (further discussion in
following section). The datapath of the cipher is constructed by a Directed Acyclic Graph
(DAG) comprising of nodes and interconnects.
Before that, each node specification by the user is subjected to some elementary rule
checks, some are as follows
— The number of inputs match the number of inputs for the operation specified, hence
two for binary operation etc.
— The S-Box values are ∈ [0..2SW ].
— P-Box, rotation/shifting, XOR operations have arguments ∈ [0..SB].
— The polynomial coefficients for GF-mul are not ∅.
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Fig. 6. The configuration file snapshot input to RunStream for Trivium
As these checks pass, a DAG is created, Fig. 7 shows the DAG to generate the feedback
bits for the LFSRs and keystream output (As a convention, the count for all nodes, phases,
interconnects and registers starts from 0). A separation of sequential and combinational
elements for Trivium can be seen.
The first layer of nodes is the Source nodes as these nodes do not take inputs from
any other nodes. Since they require no operation and are taps from the three FSRs, the
node numbers are not assigned to them. The rest of the nodes are enumerated. Node0 is
an AND operation node with two incoming interconnects (R0[90],0) and (R0[91],0) along
with one outgoing interconnect, i.e., (0,7). Node7 takes input from the source nodes as well
as the enumerated nodes, the three inputs being Node0, Node3 and R1[77]. Sink nodes
are the ones whose output is not forwarded to any other node. These include Node9,
Node10 and Node11 which are MUX by operation and control the input to the LFSRs
during the 3 phases of operation.
The interconnects between the user defined nodes are stored as a finite graph G on
n vertices where n is the sum of both the enumerated operational nodes and the source
nodes from register taps. Referring back to Trivium (Fig. 7), there are 13 enumerated
nodes and 18 source nodes. An n × n entries graph adjacency matrix holds the intercon-
nects where each entry aij represents if an edge exists from ith node to jth node or not.
Next the graph(G) undergoes a second phase of model validation by a list of defined
rule checks. The user is prompted in case of a violation and the cipher implementation
does not proceed unless a valid configuration is specified.
—G should not be an empty graph, should have no unreachable dangling nodes. It should
be a simple graph.
—G should have no duplicate edges (interconnects with same initial and head node),
hence the corresponding graph adjacency matrix holds binary elements.
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Fig. 7. The Directed Acyclic Graph for Trivium nodes implementation (datapath of cipher model)
— There should be no circular dependencies (interconnects with same node as initial and
terminal nodes). Hence all diagonal entries of the adjacency matrix should be zeros.
For simulation, the graph(G) must have an execution order for a valid sequential evalu-
ation of cipher. Although HDLs mimic a parallel execution model, for software implemen-
tations that undertake a sequential execution of code chunks. Hence an execution order
for evaluation of nodes is required for a valid simulation of the cipher model. A directed
graph with no loops makes the configuration a directed acyclic graph (DAG), whose exe-
cution order may be found by topological sorting. The nodes numbers are updated after
sorting. Fig. 5 and Fig. 9 shows DAGs with topologically sorted nodes.
4. GENERATION ENGINES AND ALGORITHM MAPPING
This section discusses the mapping of cipher model into software and hardware imple-
mentations. Modeling of stream ciphers given in Table I using RunStream is discussed
next.
4.1. Software Generation Engine
The software generation engine compiles the cipher model to generate a high perfor-
mance, fixed-point ANSI-C description. The code is enhanced by a simulation environ-
ment with user controllable switches for verification, throughput profiling, data dump-
ing etc. The generated code is not specifically optimized for a particular General Purpose
Processor (GPP), however, it has a regular structure and good code readability.
All the configuration parameters of the cipher (as specified in xml file listing in Fig. 6)
are #defined in a header file. This includes all elementary cipher parameters along with
the information about sequential resources and the sorted nodes. Data types of registers,
nodes interfaces and other controller related variables are typedef -ed in accordance with
the granularity specified.
Supplementary functions are kept in a separate file, that is included in the main file
during simulation. These functions include datatype conversion functions (e.g., conver-
sion of hexadecimal to binary arrays), data dumping and verbose simulations. For each
operational node, a separate function is defined with interface and functionality, as per
the user specified.
The main body of code, having the controller and the datapath of the cipher model, is
a separate file that #includes all supplementary and header files. For elaboration of code
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simulation environment, we refer to Trivium. Algorithm 1 gives a code chunk for phase0
of the cipher. The controller part of the cipher comprises of two local variables phase and
loop variable i, keeping count of the phase and cycle under execution, respectively. The
loop in line 2 iterates for the number of cycles defined for phase0 (P0 cnt).
In every cycle iteration, first the combinational mesh of operational nodes are executed
and then the sequential resources are updated.
— For updating the combinational nodes, the function calls to all 13 nodes are executed
(line 3-7). The inputs to the nodes are taken from the defines file while the outputs
are local variables (for node0, Node0 in0 and Node0 in1 are defined to be R0[90] and
R0[91]). The output of one node could also be input to another, as per the user specifi-
cation.
— Next the sequential elements are updated (line 8-16). R0, R1 and R2 are defined as
local arrays with user specified size and type. R0 being an LFSR, the left shifting of its
contents is carried out by a nested loop over variable j (line 7). Similarly, R1 and R2
are shifted by loops in line 10 and 12, respectively. The input tap of these LFSRs are
updated by their corresponding nodes as shown in line 14,15 and 16, respectively. The
code for value update of FSM registers follows the LFSRs update, however Trivium has
no FSM registers.
A valid keystream bit is generated from a node (node12 for Trivium) no earlier than the
last phase of cipher implementation. For the other two phases, the code listing is similar
to the one given in Algorithm 1, except the line 1 that holds different phase number.
ALGORITHM 1: RunStream generated pseudo code chunk for phase0 of Trivium stream cipher
1 phase = 2;
2 for i=0 till ≤ P0 cnt step 1 do
3 node0 out = node0(Node0 in0, Node0 in1);
4 node1 out = node1(Node1 in0, Node1 in1);
5 ...
6 node11 out = node11(Node11 in0, Node11 in1, Node11 in2, Node11 in3);
7 node12 out = node12(Node12 in0, Node12 in1, Node12 in2);
8 for j=(R0size − 1) till ≥ (0) step 1 do
9 R0[j] = R0[j − 1];
end
10 for j=(R1size − 1) till ≥ (0) step 1 do
11 R1[j] = R1[j − 1];
end
12 for j=(R2size − 1) till ≥ (0) step 1 do
13 R2[j] = R2[j − 1];
end
14 R0[0] = node9 out;
15 R1[0] = node10 out;
16 R2[0] = node11 out;
17 if (phase == 2)
then
18 keystream[i] = node12 out;
end
end
The software generation engine of RunStream generates a single-threaded, untimed,
sequential C model of the stream cipher with necessary libraries and scripts. Some of its
additional features are highlighted.
— NIST Test Suite: RunStream has the NIST test suite [NIST 2001] integrated with it to
characterize the statistical qualities of PRNGs. It serves as a first step in determining
the suitability of a PRNG used for cryptographic purposes. Fig. 13 gives a GUI snap-
shot of RunStream for the selection and parameterization of various statistical tests
available for execution as per the user wishes.
— Verification: RunStream generates a verification environment for validating the gen-
erated model according to the user specified test vectors. For known/published stream
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ciphers, the test vectors come along with the proposal, while for new proposals, the test
vectors are generated once a working ANSI C model is up and running. Therefore, test
vectors are an optional input to RunStream and should be given if known before hand.
Without defined test vectors, the verification switches may be turned off by the user.
— Performance Profiling: The user may enable a performance profiling environment
in the generated software implementation to evaluate encryption speed (in seconds, cy-
cles/byte) of the cipher design. Provision of encrypting bulk data from random plaintext
for monitoring data randomness is provided. A reasonably efficient generated imple-
mentation may be further manually optimized for a specific platform.
4.2. Hardware Generation Engine
The hardware generation engine generates a complete working model of the stream ci-
pher in synthesizable Verilog HDL along with a testbench. Fig. 8 shows the architecture
of the cipher. The toplevel module is Testbench having the stream cipher or Design under
Test (DUT ) instantiated in it. The input to the DUT is the KIV vector (after any pre-
initialization manipulation, init in Fig. 1), other than clk and reset signals. The output is
the keystream along with a single bit high-asserted signal for its validation (valid). The
granularity of the cipher determines the width of KIV and the keystream signals.
The controller and datapath are defined as separate modules, interacting with each
other through the phase signal. All definitions are kept in a separate header file.
— Controller: The controller keeps track of current phase using two registers; counter
and phase. The size of counter is taken up as ceil(log2(Pi cnt)) bits, where Pi cnt is the
cycle count of the longest of the phases. For Trivium P1 cnt = 288×4 = 1152 determines
counter size to be 11 bits. During phase0 (key setup), the FSR registers are initialized
using a 288 bit vector comprising of user specified key and IV values (P0 cnt = 1152).
As soon as the counter hits the phase count for the current phase, the phase register is
incremented and counter is cleared (as shown in Fig. 8). For all stream ciphers, a valid
output keystream is generated during the last phase of operation. Hence for Trivium,
the valid signal is asserted when phase register is incremented to 2.
— Datapath: The datapath of stream cipher comprises of sequential elements and a mesh
of nodes, for Trivium the architectural details are shown in Fig. 5. In case of multiple
nodes, all operational nodes are generated as separate modules in HDL with interface
and functionality, as per the user specified. The datapath module has instantiations of
these node modules. The sequential elements are local registers in datapath module
that are declared, reset, clocked and updated as specified by their type, granularity
and size. For Trivium, the randomization phase or phase1 and outputs of node6, node7,
node8 multiplexers are passed as inputs to R0, R1 and R2, respectively. During the last
phase, i.e., phase2, one of the terminal node, i.e., Node12 generates valid keystream
that is output of the cipher module.
Fig. 8. HDL simulation environment for a RunStream generated stream cipher implementation
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Table III. Sequential information configuration for stream ciphers taken up by RunStream
Register FSM Registers Cipher Initialization (cycles)
Arrays (bits) (bits) State (bits) Key setup+Randomization
A-5/1 3 LFSRs (19, 22, 23) - 64 86 + 100 =186
A-5/2 4 LFSRs (19, 22, 23, 17) - 81 86 + 100 =186
E0 4 LFSRs (25, 31, 33, 39) 2 (4) 132 200 + 128 =328
Grain-v1 1 LFSR (80), 1 NFSR (80) - 160 160 + 160 =320
Grain-128 1 LFSR (128), 1 NFSR (128) - 256 256 + 256 =512
Grain-128a 1 LFSR (128), 1 NFSR (128) - 256 256 + 256 =512
Trivium 3 LFSR (93, 84, 111) - 288 288 + 1152 =1440
MICKEY 2.0 2 Jump regs (2 x 100) - 160 160 + 100 =260
MICKEY-128 2 Jump regs (2 x 160) - 320 256 + 160 =416
RC4 1 reg array (8 x 256) 2 (16) 32K 256 + 256 =512
ZUC 1 NFSR (16 x 31) 2 (64) 560 16 + 32 =48
SNOW 3G 1 NFSR (16 x 32) 3 (96) 608 16 + 32 =48
Table IV. Operational nodes information for RunStream configuration of stream ciphers
Nodes
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A-5/1 - - 7 - 1 3 - - - - - - - - - 11
A-5/2 - - 9 3 4 4 - - - - - - - - - 20
E0 1 - 6 - - 4 1 - 1 - - - - 1 - 14
Grain-v1 19 - 6 - - 2 - - - - - - - - - 27
Grain-128 12 - 6 - - 2 - - - - - - - - - 20
Grain-128a 15 - 6 - - 2 - - - - - - - - - 23
Trivium 3 - 7 - - 3 - - - - - - - - - 13
MICKEY 2.0 2 - 10 - - 6 3 - - - - - - 1 - 22
MICKEY-128 2 - 10 - - 6 3 - - - - - - 1 - 22
RC4 - - - - - 9 - - - - - - - 7 6 22
ZUC - - 5 - - 3 1 8 2 - 2 - 6 2 - 29
SNOW 3G - - 7 - - 4 2 - 4 2 - - - 2 - 21
The hardware generation engine of RunStream generates a synthesizable, hierarchical
stream cipher HDL and testbench with necessary scripts that can be further used to
carryout
— Simulations for design verification, gate-level simulation (post-synthesis) using verifi-
cation tools.
— Logic synthesis of the design for profiling critical parameters like the maximum clock
frequency, chip area.
— Post-synthesis power consumption estimation with using back-annotation.
4.3. Algorithms Mapping
Using RunStream, we successfully mapped the diverse set of algorithms given in Table I.
Table IV illustrates the configuration details of various stream ciphers undertaken for
implementation by RunStream. The sequential information for these ciphers is given
in Table III. Unlike the datapath of a cipher, the controller information of the stream
ciphers changes only slightly from algorithm to algorithm. In the following discussion, we
highlight only the distinguishing features of these ciphers as they are being undertaken
by RunStream implementation methodology. Since RC4, ZUC and SNOW 3G are the only
non-binary stream ciphers undertaken, we elaborate the mapping of one of them (SNOW
3G) in detail.
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— SNOW 3G: The structural architecture and the mesh configuration of SNOW 3G [3G
2006] is shown in Fig. 9. The R0 is a 16 element NFSR array with granularity of 32,
while R1, R2 and R3 are 32-bit FSM registers, all clocked unconditionally.
The MULα and DIVα operations [3G 2006] are carried out by node0-2 and node3-5,
respectively. The SBoxes of node0 and node3 are 8×32 with a lookup table of 28 elements
of 32 bits each. The SBoxes in node11 and node13 are 8 × 8. The input word is divided
into 4 bytes, each of which is transformed by an S-Box of 28 elements of 8 bits each. The
result is concatenated and passed on to the next node (node12 and node14) which is GF-
multiplication. A valid output is generated from node10 in the keystream generation
phase.
Fig. 9. Architectural structure of SNOW 3G implementation
— A-5/1/2: A-5/1 comprises of 3 LFSR registers, sum of which equates to a 64 bit state as
given. The three LFSRs are irregularly clocked based on a majority operation node, the
3 sink nodes for LFSR feedback are multiplexers while the linear feedback nature of
the LFSRs is carried out by 7 XOR nodes, totally 11 nodes in all. A-5/2 follows a similar
structure as A-5/1, the irregular clocking is carried out by 4 majority nodes.
— E0: E0 stream cipher has 2 FSM registers of 2 bits each, other than FSRs, hence the
cipher state evaluates to a total of 132 bits.
— Grain: The Grain family of binary additive stream cipher have two FSRs, one with
linear feedback and the second with nonlinear feedback. The FSRs are updated and
the keystream is generated by means of some lightweight Boolean functions imple-
mented by XOR and AND gates only. Both Grain-128 and Grain-128a have 256 bits
state, Grain-128a has additional logic to calculate message authentication code in ad-
dition to generating a keystream.
— MICKEY: This feature of nodes operating on word sizes independent of the granular-
ity of the FSR elements is particularly useful for MICKEY family of stream ciphers.
MICKEY 2.0 has two jump registers of 100 bits each, whose each bit may be updated
per clock cycle. The variable wordsize of nodes emancipates the user by allowing him
to define operations to be performed on the whole register instead of each element.
MICKEY 2.0 requires 22 nodes for its definition, 7 of which are operations performed
on 1-bit inputs while the rest operate on 100 bits. For MICKEY-128, the node count
remains the same, the 15 nodes operate on 160 bits operations instead of 100 bits.
— RC4: The T-function of RC4 during the phase0 and phase1 requires i update, followed
by j update (taking updated value of i) along with a swap of two values of register array
(R0) taking updated values of i and j. To enable a single cycle execution of T-function
of these phases, the i and j updates are pre-calculated for the next cycle. All the corner
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conditions are evaluated and handled using the 6 compare nodes and multiplexers. A
total of 22 operational nodes are required for the operation.
— ZUC: For ZUC stream cipher, the FSR elements have 31 bits granularity, while the two
FSM registers are 32 bits each. This mismatch is incorporated by explicitly defining the
granularity of each node edge, that may not match the cipher granularity.
Using RunStream a very wide range of stream ciphers may be modeled. The first pro-
totype of our tool models the sequential states (FSRs, FSM registers) as D-flip flops.
Some stream ciphers with large states (e.g., RC4 [Schneier 1996] requiring 2K bits of
state information), external SRAMs may be employed. For an efficient implementation of
such ciphers, pipelining and optimized SRAM ports utilization is exploited. These opti-
mizations are currently not offered by RunStream, however an extension to offer SRAMs
access optimizations is on our roadmap.
5. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
This section summarizes the ASIC performance results for various HDL stream cipher
implementations, generated by RunStream. For all the stream ciphers undertaken, HDL
generation, synthesis and benchmarking has been carried out using the same design flow.
RunStream was configured in accordance with the parameters of each of the stream ci-
phers. The generated C based software implementation was tested for correctness against
the available test vectors. RTL verification was carried out using Mentor Graphics Mod-
elSim (version 10.2c).
Table V. Design results for highest operating frequencies @65nm CMOS
Cipher Max. Freq. Interface Area (GE) Power (µW)(MHz) bits Comb. Sequential Total Dynamic Leakage Total
A-5/1 1000 1 237.0 370.0 607.0 589.0 3.5 592.5
A-5/2 1000 1 263.0 455.0 718.0 1327.0 4.5 1331.5
E0 1000 1 100.5 690.0 790.5 390.8 5.0 395.8
Grain-v1 1000 1 154.5 850.0 1004.5 2272.0 7.1 2279.1
Grain-128 1000 1 134.2 1330.0 1464.3 2277.0 9.6 2286.6
Grain-128a 1000 1 144.7 1335.0 1479.8 2276.0 9.8 2285.8
Trivium 1000 1 108.0 1505.0 1613.0 3813.0 11.5 3824.5
MICKEY 2.0 1000 1 1027.2 1065.0 2092.3 4211.0 12.3 4223.3
MICKEY-128 1000 1 1591.5 1665.5 3257.0 5833.0 15.2 5848.2
RC4 1000 8 33920.6 13596.2 47516.8 1490.3 243.6 1733.9
ZUC 500 32 8404.0 3536.7 11940.7 3360.0 78.5 3438.5
SNOW 3G 1000 32 8136.0 3723.7 11859.7 17110.0 90.3 17200.3
We used Synopsys Design Compiler (version G-2012.06) with the Faraday standard cell
libraries in topographical mode to carryout synthesis of HDL. The foundry typical values
of 1.2 Volt for the core voltage and 25◦C for the temperature for UMC 65 nm CMOS logic
SP/RVT Low-K process were used. Each of the stream cipher accelerator was synthesized
and profiled for area, power consumption and maximum frequency. To profile for the
highest operating frequency, each design was repeatedly synthesized using compile ultra
option, in an incremental fashion with increasing clock frequency as long as no timing
violation was reported. The synthesis was driven by throughput maximization with the
max area constraint set to 0. As the design failed due to timing violation, we refined
the frequency in jumps of 50 MHz to look for the frequency above which no valid design
could be synthesized. All synthesis runs were carried out to optimize area. The area
figures were converted to equivalent NAND gates. The power consumption is estimated
by Synopsys Primetime (version 2009.12) based on gatelevel netlist switching activity by
back annotation. All the power estimations include the initialization and runup phases
of stream ciphers along with generation of 1024 bits of keystream.
Table V shows the area and power consumption estimates for different stream cipher
for the highest operating frequency. i.e., no valid design could be synthesized at frequency
above 0.5 GHz for ZUC stream cipher. The natural choice of interface bits width equal to
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the wordsize of each stream cipher is taken up. Area estimates of sequential and com-
binational logic, contributing to the core area are given. Understandably, RC4 has the
highest area, owing to its 32K bits state (sequential logic).
The power consumption of a core on a feature size design is a function of the com-
plexity of the design and the clock frequency. Static/leakage power is proportional to
the area, the dynamic power contributes majorly to the total power consumption of the
design. The maximum power dissipation occurs when the circuit is operated at its maxi-
mum frequency. Also, the area for any design is largest for the highest possible operating
frequency of the design. Consequently, the design results are re-calculated for 10 MHz
(10Mbps throughput for wireless LAN applications) and 100 KHz (for typical RFID ap-
plications), as given in Table VI and Table VII, respectively.
Table VI. Design results for 10 MHz @65nm CMOS
Cipher Interface Throughput Area (GE) Power (µW)bits (Mbps) Comb. Sequential Total Dynamic Leakage Total
A-5/1 1 10 237.0 370.0 607.0 11.7 3.7 15.4
A-5/2 1 10 263.0 455.0 718.0 13.3 4.5 17.8
E0 1 10 100.5 690.0 790.5 15.6 5.5 21.1
Grain-v1 1 10 152.5 850.0 1002.5 8.8 6.5 15.3
Grain-128 1 10 134.2 1330.0 1464.3 12.8 9.7 22.4
Grain-128a 1 10 144.7 1335.0 1479.8 12.8 9.8 22.5
Trivium 1 10 107.2 1505.0 1612.3 13.4 10.6 24.0
MICKEY 2.0 1 10 1023.2 1065.0 2088.3 12.7 11.2 23.9
MICKEY-128 1 10 1573.5 1665.0 3238.5 14.0 14.1 28.1
RC4 8 80 21543.7 10610.0 32153.8 8.8 143.3 152.1
ZUC 32 320 7023.0 2865.0 9888.0 156.0 56.7 212.7
SNOW 3G 32 320 6977.7 3105.0 10082.7 146.4 53.5 199.9
Table VII. Design results for 100 MHz @65nm CMOS
Cipher Interface Throughput Area (GE) Power (µW)bits Kbps Comb. Sequential Total Dynamic Leakage Total
A-5/1 1 100 237.0 370.0 607.0 0.12 3.68 3.80
A-5/2 1 100 263.0 455.0 718.0 0.13 4.53 4.66
E0 1 100 100.5 690.0 790.5 0.15 5.47 5.62
Grain-v1 1 100 152.5 850.0 1002.5 0.09 6.47 6.56
Grain-128 1 100 134.2 1330.0 1464.3 0.13 9.65 9.78
Grain128a 1 100 144.7 1335.0 1479.8 0.13 9.77 9.90
Trivium 1 100 107.2 1505.0 1612.3 0.13 10.60 10.73
MICKEY 2.0 1 100 1023.2 1065.0 2088.3 0.04 9.50 9.54
MICKEY-128 1 100 1573.5 1665.0 3238.5 0.04 10.10 10.14
RC4 8 800 21543.5 10610.0 32153.5 0.09 143.30 143.39
ZUC 32 3200 7023.0 2865.0 9888.0 1.56 56.70 58.26
SNOW 3G 32 3200 6977.7 3105.0 10082.7 1.46 53.50 54.96
As the operating frequency is lowered from the highest operating frequency to 10Mhz
the area estimates decrease. For simple bit-oriented ciphers the area estimates do not
decrease, for RC4, SNOW 3G and ZUC however, the reduction is drastic. A lower power
consumption is also accompanied with the decrease in operating frequency.
From a set of basic metrics of stream ciphers implementations (area, power, operat-
ing frequency, interface, initialization cycles), a set of derived metrics are calculated for
performance comparison as given.
— Throughput is the sustainable rate of data in keystream generation phase. It is the
product of the operating frequency and the interface bits produced per cycle.
— Energy/bit is the ratio of the total power consumption and the throughput. A low num-
ber implies an economical energy consumption and vice versa.
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— Area-time is the product of the time taken to generate each keystream bit and the area
of the cipher. The reciprocal metric is Throughput Per Area Ratio. TPAR is specifically
critical for high performance applications and is maximum at the highest operating
frequency.
Some additional derived metrics, critical for lightweight encryption or RFID applications
are given.
— Power-area-time is a triple product metric that gives a quantitative comparison of all
three critical resources of VLSI design, i.e., compactness, throughput and power con-
sumption.
— latency is the response time of a cipher (initialization phase latency) which is more
critical for RFID applications. Every time a new key or IV is introduced, the system
must bear the latency of initialization before valid keystream generation can start.
— Power-latency is the product of power consumption and latency time.
Table VIII. Derived metrics for highest operating frequencies @65nm CMOS
Throughput Energy/bit Area-Time Tput/Area Power-Area-Time
(Gbps) (pJ/bit) (GE-µs) (Kbps/GE) (GE-nJ)
A-5/1 1 0.59 0.61 1647.45 0.36
A-5/2 1 1.33 0.72 1392.76 0.96
E0 1 0.40 0.79 1265.02 0.31
Grain-v1 1 2.28 1.00 995.52 2.29
Grain-128 1 2.29 1.46 682.94 3.35
Grain-128a 1 2.29 1.48 675.79 3.38
Trivium 1 3.82 1.61 619.96 6.17
MICKEY 2.0 1 4.22 2.09 477.95 8.84
MICKEY-128 1 5.85 3.26 307.03 19.05
RC4 8 0.22 5.94 168.36 10.30
ZUC 16 0.21 0.75 1339.95 2.57
SNOW 3G 32 0.54 0.37 2698.20 6.37
Better is Higher Lower Lower Higher Lower
Table IX. Derived metrics for 100 MHz operating frequency @65nm CMOS
Energy/bit Power-Area Init. Latency Power-Area Power-
(nJ/bit) -Time (GE-µJ) cycles µs Latency (µJ-GE) Latency (nJ)
A-5/1 0.04 0.02 186 1860 0.00 7.06
A-5/2 0.05 0.03 186 1860 0.01 8.67
E0 0.06 0.04 328 3280 0.01 18.44
Grain-v1 0.07 0.07 320 3200 0.02 20.99
Grain-128 0.10 0.14 513 5130 0.07 50.16
Grain-128a 0.10 0.15 513 5130 0.08 50.77
Trivium 0.11 0.17 1440 14400 0.25 154.57
MICKEY 2.0 0.10 0.20 260 2600 0.05 24.81
MICKEY-128 0.10 0.33 416 4160 0.14 42.20
RC4 0.18 5.76 512 5120 23.61 734.15
ZUC 0.02 0.18 48 480 0.28 27.96
SNOW 3G 0.02 0.17 48 480 0.27 26.38
better is Lower Higher Lower Lower Lower Lower
For highest operating frequency these derived matrices are given in the Table VIII.
Considering a performance comparison between SNOW 3G and ZUC, ZUC outperforms
by having a lower Power-Area-Time ratio. For eSTREAM finalists, Grain-v1 outperforms
the other proposals. For 100 MHz operating frequency, the derived metrics are given in
the Table IX. The latency is compounded by lower operating frequency as it translates to
higher latency delay (shown in latency column). Here too, Grain-v1 is clearly a winner.
The derived metrics for highest operating frequencies are graphically shown in Fig. 10.
For a fair comparison we choose area-efficiency and energy per bit as our figure of merits.
For RFID applications, Fig. 11 shows core areas plotted against power-latency of the
designs, both lower being better (binary stream ciphers plotted only).
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Fig. 11. Performance for RFID applications for 100 KHz @65nm CMOS
5.1. Comparison with Manual Implementations
Since the hand-crafted HDL implementations for any algorithm are more optimized com-
pared to the tool-generated ones, for comparison of RunStream generated HDL we take
up the manually written reported implementations of the stream ciphers and compare
their efficiency. For RC4, we take up the open cores implementation [OpenCores-RC4
2013] that defines its internal state as D-flipflops. The two implementations are syn-
thesized under same CMOS technology, synthesis tool and constraints. The results are
given in Table X. The RunStream generated RTL has about 5% more area overhead in
comparison. This is due to a single cycle per keystream expansion iteration (phase1) in
RunStream RC4 implementation. The open cores RC4 implementation [OpenCores-RC4
2013] instead takes 2 cycles per iteration, though it has a relaxed critical path but in-
creased initialization latency. The area overhead for RunStream RC4 is the price paid for
this lower initialization latency.
When HDL implementation of a VLSI design is not available, a fair post-synthesis
comparison of two designs has some inherent difficulties. The results of different CMOS
synthesis technologies do not match, even with the same synthesis technology, different
vendor cell libraries generate different implementations. Additionally, different settings,
constraints or versions of synthesis tools generate differences in performance of the im-
plementations. Moreover, the best case, typical case, worst case choice is often not speci-
fied for published results. For a fair comparison of RunStream generated RTL, we strive
to have an environment as close to the one for hand-crafted reported implementations
as possible. We re-synthesize our RunStream RTL using the same synthesis technol-
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Table X. Resource comparison of RunStream implementations with others
Algorithm keystream Initialization Op. Freq. Throughput Area (GE)
name bits/cycle cycles (MHz) (Mbps) µm2 (GE)
RunStream generated RTL, 65nm CMOS
RC4 1 512 10 80 41156.80 32153.8
[OpenCores-RC4 2013], 65nm CMOS
RC4 1 768 10 80 38931.20 30415.00
RunStream generated RTL, 90nm CMOS
A-5/1 1 186 685 685 1730.29 551.75
[Gaj et al. 2007], 90nm CMOS
A-5/1 1 186 685 685 1985 -
RunStream generated RTL, 90nm CMOS
ZUC 32 48 18.75 600 32046.00 10218.75
[Traboulsi et al. 2012], 90nm CMOS
ZUC 32 48 18.75 600 - 14000
RunStream generated RTL, 65nm CMOS
ZUC 32 48 500 16000 15284.16 11940.7
[CLP-410 2011], 65nm CMOS
ZUC 32 48 500 16000 - 10-13K
RunStream generated RTL, 65nm CMOS
SNOW 3G 32 48 943 30176 13900.48 10859.7
[SNOW3G1 2011], 65nm CMOS
SNOW 3G 32 48 943 30176 - 8.9K
RunStream generated RTL, 130nm CMOS
Graini-v1 1 321 724.6 724.6 5288.78 1021
Grain-128 1 513 925.9 925.9 7676.76 1482
Trivium 1 1314 327.9 327.9 9272.20 1790
MICKEY 2.0 1 261 454.5 454.5 11494.42 2219
MICKEY-128 1 417 413.2 413.2 17829.56 3442
[Good and Benaissa 2008a], 130nm CMOS
Grain-v1 1 321 724.6 724.6 6702.92 1294
Grain-128 1 513 925.9 925.9 9712.50 1875
Trivium 1 1314 327.9 327.9 13364.40 2580
MICKEY 2.0 1 261 454.5 454.5 16513.84 3188
MICKEY-128 1 417 413.2 413.2 26102.02 5039
ogy node (with possibly different vendor libraries), same synthesis tool (with different
version) and same operating frequency. The power however, cannot be reliably scaled
between different processes and libraries and is not discussed.
For A/5-1, the only reported VLSI implementation has area estimates reported in
µm2 [Gaj et al. 2007]. RunStream results in a lower area budget of 1790µm2 against their
area figure of 1985µm2 (12% higher). For E0 and A/5-2, no CMOS implementation results
have been reported. The fastest FPGA implementation for E0 [Galanis et al. 2004] is
synthesized, placed and routed, using Xilinx FPGA device Virtex 2-2V250FG256 with a
throughput of 189 Mbps.
For ZUC we take up two VLSI implementations, one from academia at 90nm [Tra-
boulsi et al. 2012] and the other from Elliptic Technologies at 65nm [CLP-410 2011].
RunStream generated ZUC implementation matches closely with the ZUC core from El-
liptic Technologies in area estimates. For SNOW 3G too, we took up the IP Cores Inc.
implementation at 65nm and compared the RunStream generated RTL against the same
operating frequency and technology library. RunStream SNOW 3G results in around 22%
more area. Its hard to identify the reason of this overhead since the internal working of
these commercial cores for ZUC and SNOW 3G is not known. However, the synthesis
for our implementations show that the major area contribution is due to the SBoxes.
Moreover, the implementation of SBoxes is not unique and may range widely in an area-
throughput spectrum from a simplistic read-only LUT (high performance) to an equiva-
lent combinational implementation (area efficient).
A detailed study of HDL manual implementations of eSTREAM ciphers at various
phases of selection has been carried out by T. Good et. el. [Good et al. 2006; Good and
Benaissa 2007; 2008b; 2008a]. Their goal was to evaluate the suitability of the proposals
for maximum throughput, power consumption and area compactness for RFID and LAN
applications. They targeted a 130nm process using a standard cell library produced by
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Faraday. Table X compares their implementation results against the RunStream gener-
ated implementations, synthesized using 130nm standard CMOS. For the same operat-
ing frequencies (and the same throughput), the area estimates for RunStream remain
20 − 30% lower. This apparent improvement of RunStream results could be attributed
to differences in the synthesis environments. RunStream strives to facilitate fast and
reliable prototyping of stream ciphers and endeavors to come close to hand written im-
plementations.
Worth mentioning is the fact that the performance based enumeration of all the 5
eSTREAM ciphers remains exactly the same as [Good and Benaissa 2008a]. Grain-v1
outperforms both MICKEY and Trivium in terms of TPAR and energy per bit, when com-
pared for highest operating frequency (Fig. 10). At 10 Mbps data rate too, a similar enu-
meration trend for the eSTREAM ciphers is seen as in [Good and Benaissa 2008a]. For
RFID applications too, our performance based ordering for Grain-v1, Grain-128, Grain-
128a, Trivium, MICKEY 2.0 and MICKEY-128 in Fig. 11 conforms completely to [Good
and Benaissa 2008a].
The impact of choosing different building blocks, on the hardware performance of
stream ciphers can be seen from Fig. 10 and Fig. 11. The simpler primitives (LFSRs and
NFSRs) render a superior performance of Grain versions and Trivium, compared to the
jump registers based MICKEY versions. Grain-v1 outperforms Trivium in energy con-
sumption too, possibly due to a much smaller state size ( Fig. 10). The MICKEY versions
are clearly the least energy efficient (Fig. 10) and the least area efficient (Fig. 11). Due to
the large initialization latency that trivium requires for setup, it’s the least power-latency
efficient cipher of eSTREAM for RFID applications (Fig. 11), while Grain-v1 outperforms
the other four ciphers in terms of area compactness while MICKEY-128 has the highest
area overhead.
6. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORKS
We present RunStream, a novel rapid-prototyping framework for stream ciphers. We
identify the configuration space of stream ciphers, that is taken up by the RunStream
for design capture. A design validation is carried out, after whose successful completion,
an optimized software and HDL implementations are generated. We took up all the hard-
ware portfolio stream ciphers of eSTREAM, SNOW 3G, ZUG and other noticeable stream
ciphers for generation using RunStream. Equitable comparisons for area-throughput-
power were carried out. Our results rival the respective best available handwritten IP
cores.
Indeed, the long-term goal of the project is to have a tool that can generate the opti-
mized implementation of a stream cipher over a variety of platforms, including microcon-
trollers, FPGAs, ASICs, GPPs, GPUs etc. This requires inculcating some device-specific
optimizations for a range of devices catering to each of these platform categories. This
draft focused and benchmarked the ASIC implementations only. Additionally, We are
enthusiastic to extend it in various directions.
— Inclusion of cryptanalytic tools for stream ciphers.
— Enhancing RunStream to offer architectural optimizations like parallel implemen-
tations (generating higher throughput), SRAM specific memory access optimiza-
tions [Khalid et al. 2014], etc.
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Appendix
We present here some GUI snapshots of various tabs of RunStream tool. CRYKET
(CRYptographic Kernels Toolkit) caters to rapid prototyping of various cryptographic
functions while RunStream is an instance of it dealing with stream ciphers.
Fig. 12. Mesh nodes tab for RunStream showing input/outputs for Trivium’s node12. Various Stream ciphers
can be quickly loaded. Each mesh node can be configured to have an operation.
Fig. 13. NIST Test Suite tab in RunStream, various statistical tests can be chosen as per the user desires
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